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Abstract
Motivated by diverse applications in sharing economy and online
marketplaces, we consider optimal pricing and matching control
in a two-sided queueing system. We assume that heterogeneous
customers and servers arrive to the system with price-dependent
arrival rates. The compatibility between servers and customers is
specified by a bipartite graph. Once a pair of customer and server
are matched, they depart from the system instantaneously. The ob-
jective is to maximize long-run average profits of the system while
minimizing average waiting time. We first propose a static pricing
and max-weight matching policy, which achieves O(√η) optimal-
ity rate when all of the arrival rates are scaled by η. We further
show that a dynamic pricing and modified max-weight matching
policy achieves an improved O(η1/3) optimality rate. In addition,
we propose a constraint generation algorithm that solves value
function approximation of the MDP and demonstrate strong nu-
merical performance of this algorithm.
1 Introduction
A two-sided queueing system is one where customers and servers
both arrive and then wait in queues until they are matched. Many
emerging applications and rapidly growing marketplaces can be
modeled as such systems. Some examples include Uber and Lyft
where passengers are matched with drivers, Grubhub where cus-
tomers arematchedwithmeal delivery couriers, and crowdsouring
platforms where requesters are matched with contributors. Most
of these platforms use both dynamic pricing and dynamic match-
ing as levers to facilitate market profitability and efficiency.
In this paper, we consider a canonical model of a two-sided
queuing systems with n types of servers andm types of customers.
Each type of customer is allowed to be matched with only a sub-
set of server types. For example, in the case of ride hailing system,
the type of servers (cars) and passengers (customers) will be de-
termined by their geographical locations. Customers and servers
which are nearby will be compatible to be matched to each other.
At each point in time, the system operator sets a price for each
type of customer and server. Then, customers who are willing to
pay and servers who are willing to serve for the quoted price en-
ter the system. They each wait in separate queues, until they are
matched to a compatible counterpart. Once a pair is matched to
each other, they will leave the system immediately in order to com-
plete the service. The system operator earns a profit, which is equal
to the difference between the price charged to the customer and the
price quoted to the server.
We formulate the above system as a Markov decision process
(MDP). The operator can vary the price for each type of customer
and server, as well as decide when to match and which customer-
server pair to match. The objective is to maximize the profits ob-
tained by the system operator, while accounting for the queuing
delay experienced by the customers and servers. We are especially
interested in the behavior of systems with large traffic, as all of
the arrival rates are scaled by a factor η → ∞. Under this scaling
regime, any policy that is within o(η) of the optimal objective is
asymptotically optimal.
Themain challenge in this problem is the curse of dimensionality
in solving the MDP. As the number of customer and server types
increases, the dimension of the state space increases exponentially,
even when the buffer size of the queue for each type is bounded
by a constant. Thus, it is intractable to solve the exact MDP for
large scale systems, which are often encountered in practice. In this
paper, we propose approximation technique to obtain near optimal
solutions for the MDP efficiently. In addition, we propose dynamic
pricing and matching policies that are asymptotically optimal.
In summary, the key contributions in the paper are the follow-
ing:
• We model a bipartite two-sided queuing network with sto-
chastic arrivals as a Markov decision process. In some spe-
cial cases, we are able to show structural properties of the
optimal dynamic pricing policy.
• We analyze a fluid model. The revenue obtained by solving
the fluid model is an upper bound on the achievable revenue
under any policy.
• We propose a fluid pricing andmax-weight matching policy,
and show that the revenue loss from the fluid revenue is
O(√η). Thus, it is asymptotically optimal.
• We propose a two price and modified max-weight match-
ing policy, and show that the revenue loss from the fluid
revenue is reduced to O(η1/3).
• We present an approximation technique and a constraint
generation algorithm to solve the MDP efficiently. The ap-
proximation sometimes leads to a closed-form expression of
the pricing policy.
• Finally, we present a simulation study to show additional
insight into the optimal policy.
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1.1 Literature Review
Dynamic Matching. Dynamic matching markets have widespread
applications, for example, in ride sharing [4], online marketplaces
like Amazon.com or Ebay, kidney exchange [3, 22], payment pro-
cessing networks [23], quantumentanglement switch [28, 29], among
others. Now, we will discuss few previous work involving dynamic
matching in the context of two sided queues. Caldentey et al. [7]
and Adan and Weiss [1] consider bipartite matching for two-sided
queues on a first-come-first-served basis: each arriving customer
is matched to a compatible server who has the earliest arrival time
and has not been matched. Under this matching rule, they ana-
lyzed limiting results of matching rates between certain customer
and server types. Furthermore, they deduced the necessary condi-
tions on the frequency of arrivals for stability of the system and
also derived the stationary distribution. Gurvich and Ward [9] an-
alyze a general multi-sided queuing system, where more than two
sides may be present. The objective is to minimize finite time cost
incurred due to queuing. They presented a matching algorithm
and showed asymptotic optimalitywith rate of convergenceO(√η)
where arrivals are scaled by η.
Hu and Zhou [12] studied a two-sided matching system similar
to ours. The goal is to maximize the discounted reward obtained
by matching customers and servers in a finite horizon, while ac-
counting for the holding costs. They study conditions such that a
priority rule is optimal. In addition, they present a matching algo-
rithm based on fluid approximation and show that it is asymptot-
ically optimal. The main distinction of [12] with our paper is that
they do not consider dynamic pricing. In addition, while they use
fluid approximation to generate matching decisions, we use max-
weight algorithm instead formatching decisions (see discussion on
max-weight algorithm below).
Matching problems were also studied in the context of kidney
exchanges albeit in a non-two-sided setting in [2, 3]. These papers
study the value of “batching”, i.e., holding compatible matching
pairs in hope that better matching will arrive in future. However,
both papers find that batching in general does not provide signifi-
cant benefit.
Dynamic Pricing foreues. Dynamic pricing is a common mech-
anism for increasing revenue. First we discuss the literature involv-
ing dynamic pricing in the context of single sided queue and later
also present some papers involving two sided queues. Low [16] is
one of the earlier works studying dynamic pricing in a single sided
queue. The paper considered price dependent customer arrivals
with a finite buffer; the rewards include the payment by customers
and holding costs incurred by the operator. Monotonicity of the
optimal pricing policy is showed. It was later extended to infinite
buffer capacity in [17]. Chen and Frank [8] considered a queuing
model with customers who are sensitive to both waiting time and
price. They presented structural properties on optimal pricing de-
cisions and monotonicity of optimal value function. In the context
of network services like call centers, Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis [20]
considered a systemwith finite total resource. They consider differ-
ent types of price dependent customers arrivals which requests for
a fraction of the resource. The objective is to find a pricing policy
to maximize the revenue. They show multiple structural proper-
ties like concavity of value function and monotonicity of optimal
policy.
Kim and Randhawa [14] considers a single server queuing sys-
tem and studies the benefit of dynamic pricing over static pricing.
They consider that the customers are delay sensitive and consider
similar objective as ours, which is to maximize the revenue. They
present asymptotically optimal dynamic pricing policy and a two
price policy and also provide the rate of convergence of these poli-
cies. The main distinction of [14] with our paper is that they con-
sider a single server queue, whereas we consider a more general
setting of a network of queues. In addition, [14] involves one sided
queue.
A two-sided model with both customer and server arrivals is
studied by Nguyen and Stolyar [19]. They consider server arrival
by invitationwhich is analogous to pricing for the servers. The cus-
tomers and servers are allowed to abandon, which ensures stability.
However, the focus in [19] was to establish process level conver-
gence, while the objective in our model is to maximize the profit
of the system.
There is extensive study of dynamic pricing in the context of
ride hailing systems [11, 15]. Banerjee et al. [4, 5] study a closed
queuing network, where the number of cars in the system is a
constant and the customers abandon the system if they are not
matched immediately. [4] provides a state-independent pricing pol-
icy and prove the approximation ratio with respect to optimal pric-
ing policy. [5] provides a state-dependent pricing policy and argue
that the benefit of dynamic pricing is in the robustness of the per-
formance of the system.
Dynamic pricing mechanisms have also been extensively stud-
ied in revenue management literature in a more general setting
[25]. In our model, we use dynamic pricing as a lever to increase
system operator’s profit while making the system stable. Note that
dynamic pricing subsumes external control like admission control
of customers and on-demand servers (rejection is equivalent to in-
creasing prices to infinity). To the best of our knowledge, our paper
is among the first to study joint dynamic pricing and matching in
the context of two-sided queues.
Max-Weight Algorithm. In this work, we propose a max-weight
matching algorithm for a two-sided queuing problem. This algo-
rithm was first proposed by Tassiulas and Ephremides [27] in the
context of communication networks. After that, the max-weight
algorithm and the backpressure algorithm, which is a generaliza-
tion of the max-weight algorithm, are studied intensively in the
literature. The book by Srikant and Ying [24] provides an excel-
lent summary. The performance of max-weight algorithm in the
context of a switch operating in heavy traffic has been studied by
Maguluri and Srikant [18]. The backpressure algorithm was used
in the context of online ad matching in [26] and in the context of
ride hailing in [13].
1.2 Notation
Throughout the paper, vectors are boldfaced.We use 〈., .〉 to denote
dot product between two vectors. All the functions applied on a
vector is componentwise, e.g. F (λ) is defined to be (F (λ1), . . . , F (λm)).
Moreover, a ≤ b means that all the components of a is less than
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Figure 1: Multiple Link Two Sided Queue
or equal to corresponding components of b . In addition, we define
the vector e
(2)
j and e
(1)
i as a vector with all zeros except a one for
type j customer and type i server respectively. Throughout the pa-
per, we use i and superscript (1) to denote a server type and j and
superscript (2) to denote a customer type. We define E[.] for ex-
pected value of a random variable and the conditional expectation
E[.|x] is written as Ex [.] for the ease of notation. We denote the
set {1, 2, . . . ,n} by [n]. We denote the vector with all 1’s as 1n with
sizen; we will sometimes omit the subscript if the size of the vector
is clear from the context wherever it is used. In addition, we define
0n as the vector with all 0’s of size n and we omit the subscript
if the size of the vector is clear from the context. For the vectors
x ∈ Rn and y ∈ Rm , we denote the concatenated vector of n+m di-
mension by (x, y). If x and y are of the same dimension, we denote
the component wise product by x ◦ y.
2 Model
We model the multiple types of customers and servers by a bipar-
tite graph G(N1 ∪ N2,E), where N1 is the set of server types with
|N1 | = n and N2 is the set of customers type with |N2 | =m. Here,
E are the set of edges in the bipartite graph between customer and
server types which are compatible with each other. In other words,
(i, j) ∈ E if type j customer can be served by type i server. Each
node in the bipartite graph is a queue of customers or servers wait-
ing to be matched with any one of the compatible counterpart.
Our convention is to refer the incoming demand as customers
and incoming supply as servers, which arrive according nonho-
mogenous Poisson processes. At each point in time, the system
operator posts a price for each type of customers and servers. Cus-
tomers willing to pay the quoted price, as well as the servers who
are willing to provide their service for the quoted price, are admit-
ted to the system. Thus, the system operator can vary the prices
of the customers and servers to vary their arrival rate. Once they
are in the system, they wait in queues until they are picked and
matched. First-come-first-serve (FCFS) discipline is employed for
each queue separately. Note that, unlike [1, 7], FCFS may not hold
among different types of customers/servers, it will rather depend
on the matching policy used. Once the customer is matched with
a compatible server, we assume that they depart from the system
instantaneously to complete the transaction.
Our objective is to find a joint pricing and matching policy un-
der which the system is stable (positive recurrent) and the long-run
average profit is maximized.
Next, we present some notation and assumptions on the pric-
ing decisions and the matching decisions. We assume that cus-
tomers and servers arrive according to Poisson processes with rate
λ ∈ Rm
+
and µ ∈ Rn
+
respectively. For each customer type j ∈ [m],
there exists a demand curve Fj : λj → p(2)j , such that if the system
operator sets a price p
(2)
j , the resulting arrival rate is λj . Similarly,
for each server type i ∈ [n], the system operator can set a price de-
noted by p
(1)
i , which results in a server arrival rate µi determined
by the respective supply curve Gi : µi → p(1)i . We make the follow-
ing assumption on the supply and demand curve.
Assumption 1. The supply curves, Gi , ∀i ∈ [n] are monotoni-
cally increasing and twice continuously differentiable. The demand
curves, Fj , ∀j ∈ [m] are monotonically decreasing and twice contin-
uously differentiable.
Intuitively, this assumption means that offering higher price to
the servers will result in higher server arrival rate, offering the
service for lower prices will result in higher customer arrival rate,
and all curves are smooth.
In addition, we define the revenue and cost functions as r
(2)
j (λj )
∆
=
λjFj (λj ) for all j ∈ [m] and r (1)i (µi )
∆
= µiGi (µi ) for all i ∈ [n]. We
make the following assumption on the revenue and cost functions.
Assumption 2. The revenue function r
(2)
j (λj ) is concave ∀j ∈ [m].
The cost function r
(1)
i (µi ) is convex ∀i ∈ [n].
The assumption on revenue function follows from the law of
diminishing marginal return: as we increase the customer arrival
rate, the marginal revenue dr
(2)
j (λj )/dλj decreases, which implies
that the revenue function r
(2)
j (λj ) is concave. Similar assumption
is often assumed in the revenue management and queueing litera-
ture (see e.g. [14]). As for the servers, we assume the marginal cost
dr
(1)
i (µi )/dµi increases with µi , since it becomes harder to recruit
servers when we try to increase server arrival rate. This implies
that the cost function r
(1)
i is convex.
In addition to setting prices, the system operator uses match-
ing to govern the process of the queueing system. At any given
time, suppose q
(2)
j is the number of type j customers waiting in the
queue and q
(1)
i is the number of type i servers. We denote by xi j
the number of type i servers to be matched to type j customers.
The number of matchings should be bounded by both the num-
ber servers and the number of customers currently waiting in the
queue, so we have
x
(2)
j =
n∑
i=1
xi j ≤ q(2)j , ∀j ∈ [m], (1)
x
(1)
i =
m∑
j=1
xi j ≤ q(1)i , ∀i ∈ [n], (2)
xi j = 0, ∀(i, j) < E, (3)
Varma et al.
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Figure 2: Illustration of a ride hailing system with three re-
gions. We assume that riders can only be matched to cars
in their own region or any neighboring regions. Subfigure
(b) shows the two sided system generated from the map in
subfigure (a).
We denote byX (q) the set of matchings that satisfies (1)–(3). When
a pair of customer and server is matched by the system, they both
depart from the system. Since a customer is only compatible to a
subset of server types, the system operator may have incentive for
batching, i.e., holding some customers or servers in queue in order
to achieve better matches in future.
Example: Ride Hailing. An application of our two-sided queue-
ing model is the ride hailing system. In this system, the customer
and server (drivers) types, as well as the matching compatibility
graph, are determined by their geographical location. (A simple ex-
ample with three regions is shown in Figure 2.) Based on the price
quoted to customers, only a fraction of themwho open the app will
book a ride, which determines the customer arrival rate. Similarly,
based on the price quoted to the drivers, they will choose whether
or not to provide service. Thus, the arrival rate of customer and
drivers are price dependent and is governed by the demand and
supply curve of each region. Once a customer confirms the price
and books a ride, the system operator can determine which driver
(fromwhat region) should bematched to the customer. If the driver
accepts the ride request, then it immediately becomes unavailable
for any other ride requests (departing from the system). After the
ride is complete, the car becomes available again, possibly in a dif-
ferent region. A simplifying assumption in our model is that we
treat a driver who completes the service and re-enters the system
the same as a new arrival.
2.1 CTMDP Formulation
We now formally define the system operator’s decision process as
a continuous time Markov decision process (CTMDP), including
its states, actions, rewards, and objective.
Rewards and costs: With every customer arrival, the system
operator earns a reward equal to the price set for that customer
type; similarly, the system operator pays a cost with each server
arrival equal to the price set for that server type. Additionally, the
system operator incurs a holding cost proportional to the number
of customers and servers waiting in the system per unit time.
States: The state is represented by the queue lengths of all cus-
tomer and server types, q ∈ Zn+m
+
. We denote the state space by
S .
Actions: By Assumption 1, prices and arrival rates have a one-
one correspondence. Thus, rather than using price as the action,
we equivalently use arrival rates λ(q), µ(q) for all q ∈ S as the
action. The arrival rates much satisfy λj ∈ dom(Fj ) for all j ∈ [m]
and µi ∈ dom(Gi ) for all i ∈ [n]. Here, dom(F ) is the domain of
the function F . In addition, the matching decisions x(q) ∈ X (q)
are also in the action space (see Eq (1)–(3). Thus action is a tuple
(λ, µ, x) ∈ R2(m+n).
Objective: The objective is to find a pricing and matching pol-
icy such that the long run average profit earned by the system op-
erator is maximized. We are only interested in the pricing policies
under which make the system stable in the long run. The following
definition of stability will be used.
Definition 2.1. A joint pricing and matching policy is said to be
stable, if the continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) induced from
this policy has a positive recurrent communicating class that con-
tains the state q = 0.
TheMDP advances as follows: Upon each customer or server ar-
rival, we match customers and servers by setting x ∈ X (q). We al-
low x = 0m+n , i.e., none of the customer-server pairs are matched.
Immediately after the arrival, we may change the prices for any
customer and server type. Based on the prices set, future type j cus-
tomer arrivals follow Poisson(λj ) for all j ∈ [m], and type i server
arrivals follow Poisson(µi ) for all i ∈ [n].
Remark 1 (Discussion of waiting costs). Our model assumes
all customers and servers are patient, and the system operator pays
a cost proportional to their waiting time. As an alternative approach,
Kim and Randhawa [14] considered a queueing model without such
payment to customers — instead, they assume customers are strategic
andwill not joint the queue if their valuation of the service is less than
their expected waiting cost. Compared to our model, the assumption
by [14] may be more appropriate for some applications of two-sided
queues such as ride hailing. Nevertheless, [14] point out that their
assumption of strategic customers is essentially equivalent to a model
with patient customers by explicitly accounting for waiting cost, i.e.,
our approach. We refer readers to [14, Section 6.1] for more details.
2.2 Uniformization
We use the well-known uniformization technique [21] to obtain
an equivalent discrete-time Markov Decision Process chain (DT-
MDP), which will simplify our analysis. The uniformized process
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is as follows. We first choose a uniformization parameter c defined
below.
Definition 2.2. Suppose there exists λmax and µmax such that
for any price vector p we have,
λ(p) ≤ λmax ,
µ(p) ≤ µmax .
Let c be any constant such that
c ≥ 〈1m ,λmax 〉 +
〈
1n , µmax
〉
. (4)
The uniformized DTMDP is endowed with the same states and
actions as the CTMDP defined in Section 2.1. All the rewards and
costs will be scaled by 1/c . In each period, there is at most one cus-
tomer or server arrival. Let p be price vector. The probability that
a type j customer arrives in one period is λj (p)/c . The probability
that a type i server arrives in one period is µi (p)/c . Otherwise, no
arrival happens in this period. The decision maker is allowed to
make any number of matchings as long as they satisfy constraints
(1)-(3).
Bellman Equation. To find the optimal pricing and matching pol-
icy, we start by writing the Bellman equation for the uniformized
DTMDP. LetZ (q) = [0, λmax]∪[0, µmax]∪X(q) be the set of feasible
prices and matchings for queue length q. We use z to denote a joint
action vector, which includes pricing decisions λ, µ and matching
decisions x ∈ X (q).
The Bellman equation can be written as
h(q) + д
c
= max
z∈Z (q)
{R(q, z)
c
+Eq,z[V (h,q, z)]
}
,∀q ∈ S, (5)
where
R(q, z) = 〈F (λ),λ〉 − 〈G(µ), µ〉 − s 〈1, q〉 , (6)
Eq,z[V (h,q, z)] =
m∑
j=1
λj
c
h(q + e(2)j − x(k))
+
n∑
i=1
µi
c
h(q + e(1)i − x(k))
+ (1 −
m∑
j=1
λj
c
−
n∑
i=1
µi
c
)h(q) (7)
λj (q) = 0 if q(2)j = b ∀j ∈ [m],
µi (q) = 0 if q(1)i = b ∀i ∈ [n].
The solution д to the above equations is the optimal infinite hori-
zon average profit. h(q) as the value function (or bias function)
associated with each state.
In the Bellman equation, R(q, z) is the expected revenue for the
state q and action z. The revenue term is the net of what the cus-
tomer pays and server gets alongwith a penalty proportional to the
sum of the queue lengths. The term Eq,z[V (h,q, z)] is the expecta-
tion of the value function h after one transition in the uniformized
process where q is the queue length, z is the chosen action at the
current decision epoch. The expectation is taken with respect to
arrival probabilities of the uniformized DTMDP.
3 Monotonicity of the Optimal Prices
(Single Link Two-Sided Queue)
In this section, we consider the special case of our model with n =
1 and m = 1, i.e. a single link two-sided queue given in Fig. 3.
The goal of this section is to establish structural properties of the
optimal pricing policy by analyzing this simple system, which will
motivate our pricing policies for more complex systems.
Customer Server
Figure 3: Single Link Two Sided Queue
In a single link system, there is clearly no incentive for the op-
erator to hold customer or server. Whenever possible, we should
match the incoming arrival immediately. Thus, at any point of time,
there can only be either customers or servers waiting in the system.
This enables up to reduce the state space by letting q = q(2) − q(1),
the difference between the number of customers and servers wait-
ing in the system. Note that, q can be either positive or negative.
Using q as the system state, the Bellman equation (5) becomes
h(q) = max
µ≥0,λ≥0
[
F (λ)λ −G(µ)µ
c
− s |q |
c
− д
c
+
λ
c
h(q+1)
+
(
1 − µ + λ
c
)
h(q) + µ
c
h(q − 1)
]
∀q ∈ S, (8)
where c is a uniformization parameter (see Definition 2.2). In the
equation above, as we have n = m = 1, we omit the subscripts
for different type of customers and servers for the ease of notation.
We now present the monotonicity theorem below.
Theorem 3.1. For a single link two-sided queue, there exists an
optimal pricing policy p(q) = (p(1)(q),p(2)(q)), where both the server
price p(1)(q) and the customer price p(2)(q) increases monotonically
with the system state q.
To show this, we first show that the difference of value function
h(q) − h(q − 1) is monotonically decreasing in q by an inductive
argument on the iterates of the relative value iteration algorithm.
Then we use the optimality conditions on the Bellman equation
to show that the optimal pricing policy is monotonic. The com-
plete proof can be found in Appendix B. This result motivates us
to search for the optimal pricing policy in the restricted space of
monotonic pricing policies, which will be presented in Section 6.
4 Asymptotic Optimality of Fluid Solution
In this section, we consider the fluid approximation of the sys-
tem. We then present a static pricing policy motivated by this fluid
model and show that it is asymptotically optimal.
4.1 Fluid Approximation
We will now present a fluid model which is a first order approxi-
mation for this system. We define χi j as the rate of type i server
matched to the type j customer for all (i, j) ∈ E. This can be in-
terpreted as the long run average number of customer-server pair
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matched using the link (i, j). We also define λ˜ and µ˜ as the effec-
tive arrival rate of the customers and servers respectively given
by E[λ(q)] and E[µ(q)], where the expectation is with respect to
the stationary distribution of the CTMC operating under the given
pricing and matching policy. Now, we can write the deterministic
optimization problem to maximize the average long run revenue
as
max
(λ˜, µ˜, χ )
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
− 〈G(µ˜), µ˜〉 (9)
subject to,
λ˜j =
∑
i
χi j , ∀j ∈ [m], (10)
µ˜i =
∑
j
χi j , ∀i ∈ [n], (11)
χi j = 0, ∀(i, j) < E, χi j ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E. (12)
Here, Equation (10) (and (11)) is the rate balance of the incom-
ing customers (servers) and the total customers (servers) that are
matched to their counterpart. Also, (12) allows only the matching
of a compatible customer-server pair. Intuitively, it is easy to see
that these constraints are necessary because if the rates do not
match then the waiting customer or server will keep accumulating
over time. Moreover, these are not sufficient conditions tomake the
system stable as two-sided queues are inherently unstable as dis-
cussed in Section 2. Thus, if we solve this optimization program to
maximize the revenue, we will get an upper bound on the achiev-
able revenue under any pricing and matching policy which makes
the system stable. Now, we will show that these are necessary but
not sufficient constraints to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. The optimal objective function value (9) obtained
by solving the fluid problem (9)-(12) gives an upper bound on the op-
timal average revenue under any pricing and matching policy which
makes the system stable.
Idea of the Proof. We first show that under any pricing and
matching policy, the constraints in the fluid problem are necessary
but not sufficient conditions. Intuitively, the average arrival rates
of customers and servers should be able to balance each other out.
Next, we show that the average revenue obtained under any pric-
ing and matching policy is less than equal to the fluid objective
function. These two conditions together implies that fluid prob-
lem will give us an upper bound on the revenue obtained under
any pricing and matching policy. The formal proof can be found
in Appendix C. 
4.2 Fluid Pricing Policy
In this section, we study the system in the regime where the arrival
rates of all the customer and server types are scaled by a factor of
η. We show that the fluid solution, which is an upper bound on the
revenue of the ride hailing system, can be attained in the asymp-
totic regime η → ∞. We consider a policy where matching is done
according to the MaxWeight policy that we will define. Pricing is
done according to the optimal fluid prices. Moreover, we assume
that the buffer capacity q
η
max can be scaled as a function of η. In
this setting, we show that the loss of revenue compared to the opti-
mal policy is at mostO(√η).We do this by first establishing that the
revenue loss under fluid pricing policy in a single link two-sided
queue is Θ(√η) after picking a specific qmax as a function of η.
We consider the fluid pricing policy, i.e. the prices for all the
customer and server types are constant. Thus, the arrival rates are
also constant. The optimal arrival rates are obtained by solving the
fluid LP (9), (10), (11) and (12). In other words,λ and µ are such that
it maximizes the revenue 〈F (λ),λ〉 − 〈G(µ), µ〉 and they belong to
the set C, where the set is defined as,
C
E
=
{
λ, µ : ∃χ ∈ Rn×m
+
λj =
∑
i
χi j , ∀j ∈ [m], µi =
∑
j
χi j ,
∀i ∈ [n], χi j = 0, ∀(i, j) < E
}
. (13)
We denote the maximizer by λ∗, µ∗ ∈ CE . The pricing policy is
λ
η
j (q) =
{
ηλ∗j , ∀q s.t. q
(2)
j ≤ q
η(2)
max j ,
0 otherwise,
∀j ∈ [m],
µ
η
i (q) =
{
ηµ∗i , ∀q s.t. q
(1)
i ≤ q
η(1)
maxi ,
0 otherwise,
∀i ∈ [n],
where q
η
max is a design parameter which can be chosen carefully
to optimize the policy to maximize the revenue. Note that, q
η
max
is a design parameter which can be chosen by the system operator
to maximize the revenue. Also note that, for different η, the system
operator has the freedom to choose different value of q
η
max . Now,
the objective can be thought of as choosing q
η
max for all η such
that the fluid pricing policy is optimal asymptotically.
The matching policy we define is as follows: The system opera-
tor is allowed tomatch every time the system state changes. When-
ever there is an arrival, if any of the compatible counterparts of the
arrival is waiting in the queue, then we match it to the type with
most number of customers/servers waiting in that queue. On the
other hand, if all the compatible counterparts’ queues are empty,
then we can’t match it to anyone and that arrival will then wait in
the queue until in the future, some other arrival is matched to it.
For the kth arrival in the system, we denote the current time
by k . Also, we denote the arrival by a(k) ∈ {0, 1}m+n . To expound,
a(k) has one component non zero corresponding to the arrival type
and all the other components to be zero.
We definey
(1)
i j (k) ∈ {0, 1} to be the decision of matching a type j
customer to a type i server at the arrival of a type i server. Similarly,
we also define y
(2)
i j (k) ∈ {0, 1} to be decision of matching a type i
server to type j customer at the arrival of type j customer. Note
that we will have xi j (k) = y(1)i j (k) + y
(2)
i j (k).
We also define N (i) to be the set of all the counterparts of i such
that they are compatible, i.e. for type i server, we have (i, j) ∈ E for
all j ∈ N (i).
We will now analyze the resultant CTMC operating under the
Fluid pricing and max-weight matching policy to quantify the rev-
enue loss from the Fluid revenue R∗. Before that, we define the as-
ymptotic regime under which we will study the revenue loss and
we also define the revenue loss below.
Definition 4.2 (Asymptotic Regime). Consider a family of CTMC
parametrized by η such that for the ηth CTMC, the demand and
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Algorithm 1Max-Weight Matching Policy
Input: queue length q(k), new arrival a(k) # k is a decision
epoch
2: Initialization: y(1)(k) = 0n , y(2)(k) = 0m
for i ∈ [n] do
4: if a
(1)
i (k) = 1 and maxj∈N (i ) q
(2)
j > 0 then
j = argmaxj′ ∈N (i ) q
(2)
j
′
6: y
(1)
i j (k) = 1
end if
8: end for
for j ∈ [m] do
10: if a
(2)
j (k) = 1 and maxi ∈N (j) q
(1)
i > 0 then
i = argmaxi ′ ∈N (j) q
(1)
i
′
12: y
(2)
i j (k) = 1
end if
14: end for
Output: y(1)(k), y(2)(k)
supply curve satisfy Fη (ηλ) = F (λ) for all λ ∈ Rm
+
and Gη (ηµ) =
G(µ) for all µ ∈ Rn
+
. The asymptotic regime is defined as η → ∞.
Thus, the fluid optimal arrival rates for the ηth CTMC will be
ηλ∗ and ηµ∗ where λ∗, µ∗ is the optimal solution of the fluid prob-
lem (9)-(12).
Definition 4.3 (Revenue Loss). The revenue loss for a policy, de-
noted by Lη , is defined as the expected value of the difference of the
fluid revenue R
η
∗ and the revenue obtained (including the penalty
incurred due to waiting) when the CTMC is operating under the
given policy.
The revenue loss for the fluid pricing policy can be calculated as
follows: Whenever any queue length’s buffer capacity is full, say
q
(1)
i = q
η(1)
maxi , then all the future arrivals in i queue will be rejected
until some of the servers waiting in i queue is matched and the
queue length q
(1)
i becomes less than q
η(1)
maxi . Thus, we will lose a
fraction of revenue due to rejection of customers/servers due to
the buffer capacity and it is exactly quantified by π (qηmax ).
Lη = R
η
∗ − (Rη − s 〈1m+n ,E[q]〉)
= η
( 〈
F (λ∗),λ∗〉 − 〈G(µ∗), µ∗〉 ) − η (〈F (λ∗),λ∗◦(1−π (qη(2)max )〉
−
〈
G(µ∗), µ∗ ◦ (1 − π (qη(1)max ))
〉 )
+ s 〈1m+n ,E[q]〉
= η
( 〈
F (λ∗), (λ∗ ◦ π (qη(2)max ))
〉
−
〈
G(µ∗), (µ∗ ◦ π (qη(1)max )
〉 )
+ s 〈1m+n ,E[q]〉 , (14)
where π (qη(1)max ) = (P[q(1)1 = q
η(1)
max1], . . . ,P[q
(1)
n = q
η(1)
maxn ]) which
will depend on the matching policy and parameters of the pricing
policy.
If we increase the buffer capacity q
η
max , then the probability
of dropping customers/servers will reduce, i.e. π (qηmax ) will de-
crease. Although, increasing the buffer capacity will also lead to
increasing the expected value of the queue lengths which will in-
crease the penalty incurred due to waiting. Thus, there is a trade
off and intuitively, choosing buffer capacity to balance the trade off
will minimize the revenue loss. Precisely, we will see that choosing
q
η
max ∼ √η will result in π (qmax ) ∼ η−1/2 and E[q] ∼ √η. Thus,
satisfying the trade off between π (qmax ) and E[q].
First, we consider a single link two-sided queue (q(1)(k),q(2)(k))
operating under fluid pricing policy with a buffer capacity of q
η
max
for both the customers and servers. The arrivals are immediately
matched upon arrivals if possible, otherwise they wait in the queue
until they are matched. Thus, for any instance either the customer
queueq(1) or the server queueq(2) is empty. Now,wewill show that
the optimal revenue loss for a family of single link two-sided queue
parametrized by η upon scaling the buffer capacity appropriately
is Θ(√η).
Proposition 4.4. For the family of single link two-sided queue
parametrized by η operating under the fluid pricing policy, the “opti-
mal revenue loss Lη” due to stochasticity is Θ(√η) for qηmax = γ√η
for any constant γ .
The proof of the proposition is straight forward and is presented
in Appendix D.
Remark 2. Intuitively, the single link two-sided queuing system
is a good model for a resource pooledmultiple link two-sided queuing
system as any incoming customer can be matched to any incoming
server in a single link two-sided queue. So, we should expect that the
single link two-sided queuing system gives an upper bound on the
performance of a multiple link two-sided queuing system with same
total arrivals and same pricing policy.
We will now show that the family of multiple link two-sided
queuesG(N1
⋃
N2,E) parametrized by η operating under the Fluid
pricing policy and max-weight matching policy, the revenue loss
is O(√η) by upper bounding the term
〈
F (λ∗), (λ∗ ◦ π (qη(2)max ))
〉
in
terms of q
η
max . The theorem is presented below.
Theorem 4.5. For the family of multiple link two-sided queues
with a given compatibility graph G(N1
⋃
N2,E) parametrized by η
operating under the Fluid pricing policy and max-weight matching
policy, the revenue loss Lη due to stochasticity isO(√η)when qηmax =
γ
√
η for any vector of constants γ .
We only present the idea of the proof here and the proof details
are deferred to Appendix E.
Idea of the Proof. We consider the ηth system and bound the
probability of dropping a customer and server in terms of q
η
max . To
do this, we calculate the expression of pi (qηmax ) using the moment
bound theorem [10]. Next, we bound the expected queue length by〈
1m+n , q
η
max
〉
. Finally, we use these expressions to pick qmax as
Θ(√η) and bound the revenue loss to get the theorem. 
5 Asymptotic Optimality of Two Price Policy
In this section, we present a two price policy that has a revenue
loss of O(η1/3). We first present a couple of definitions before pre-
senting the two price policy. We start by defining a set CE
+
which
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is related to the set CE as follows:
C
E
+
=
{
λ, µ : ∃χ ∈ Rn×m
+
λj =
∑
i
χi j ∀j ∈ [m], µi =
∑
j
χi j
∀i ∈ [n], χi j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E, χi j > 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E
}
.
Unlike CE , in CE
+
we need χi j to be non zero for all (i, j) ∈ E.
Note that, CE
+
⊆ CE , so if λ∗, µ∗ ∈ CE
+
then λ∗, µ∗ ∈ CE but the
converse may not be true. Also note that CE
′
⊆ CE if E′ ⊆ E. We
now define the minimal capacity serving graph and will work with
this augmented version of the graph in this section.
Definition 5.1. Minimal Capacity Serving Graph is the graph
G(N1
⋃
N2,E
∗), where E∗ is the solution of the optimization prob-
lem,
max |E′ | (15)
subject to,
{E′ : E′ ⊆ E, (λ∗, µ∗) ∈ CE
′
+
} (16)
Note that the above optimization problem is feasible for any
given graph G(N1
⋃
N2,E) as one of the feasible solution to the
problem can be constructed as follows:
As (λ∗, µ∗) ∈ CE , there exists χ ∗ such that it satisfies the con-
straints in the definition of C (13). Now just remove all the edges
(i, j) ∈ E for which χ∗i j = 0. When there exists multiple χ ∗, we
pick the one with the smallest number of zeros to maximize the
number of edges in E∗ .
Also, there are finite number of subsets of E, so the maximum
will be attained. Also note that as CE
∗
+
⊆ CE∗ ⊆ CE , the fluid
optimal solution for the graphG(N1
⋃
N2,E
∗) will be (λ∗, µ∗).
We define N ∗(i) to be the set of compatible counterparts of the
vertex i in the graphG(N1 ∪ N2, E∗). In this section, we will work
with the minimum capacity serving graph. Now we will define the
pricing and matching policy below.
The pricing policy is a generalization of the fluid pricing policy.
Here, we introduce additional parameters θ and ϕ which governs
the arrival rates of the customers and servers respectively when
the queue length is greater than a certain threshold qtp . As it is a
generalization of the fluid policy, we expect a better performance if
we choose the parameters carefully. The two price policy is given
by the following:
λ
η
j =
{
ηλ∗j if q
(2)
j ≤ q
η(2)
tpj
,
ηλ∗j − θ
η
j otherwise
∀j ∈ [m], (17)
µ
η
i =
{
ηµ∗i if q
(1)
i ≤ q
η(1)
tpi
,
ηµ∗i − ϕ
η
i otherwise
∀i ∈ [n]. (18)
(19)
Here, q
η
tp , θ
η and ϕη are parameters which can be chosen by the
operator. In words, we set a threshold q
η(2)
tpj
for a j type of customer,
such that we use fluid arrival rates until this threshold and then re-
duce the arrival rates by θ
η
j outside this threshold for all j ∈ [m].
Similarly, we reduce the server arrival rates outside a threshold.
Our convention is to superscript any parameter or quantity by η
which is associated with the ηth CTMC since these parameters can
be chosen as functions of η. Note that, q
η
tp in this section, plays a
similar role as q
η
max in the previous section. It is a threshold which
determines the change of arrival rate of customers and servers and
is a model parameter which can be chosen by the system operator
to maximize the revenue. Here, the objective can be thought as set-
ting q
η
tp , θ
η and ϕη such that the revenue is maximized. Here, θη
and ϕη determines the drift of the CTMC towards zero. If θη and
ϕη are large (small), then E[q] will be small (large) but the arrival
rates outside the threshold q
η
tp will be far (close) from the fluid
arrival rates which will result in large (small) revenue loss. Thus,
there is a trade off between the expected queue length and revenue
loss (the difference of the revenue obtained and fluid revenue). We
will see that, choosing q
η
tp ∼ η1/3, θη ∼ η2/3 and ϕη ∼ η2/3 will re-
sult in E[q] ∼ η1/3 and the revenue loss (difference of the revenue
obtained and fluid revenue) to be ∼ η1/3.
For matching, we use max-weight policy on the graph G(N1 ∪
N2,E
∗) as described in Algorithm 1.We call this, the modifiedmax-
weight policy. Inwords, wewill never match using the edgeswhich
are in E but not in E∗. Now, we have defined the pricing policy and
the matching policy under which the system operates.
Now, we will present the theorem which states that the optimal
two price policy is optimal and the asymptotic performance of this
policy as η tends to infinity is better than the fluid policy.
Theorem 5.2. For a family of multiple link two-sided queues with
a given compatibility graph G(N1
⋃
N2,E) parametrized by η oper-
ating under the two price policy and modified max-weight match-
ing policy, the revenue loss Lη due to stochasticity is O(η1/3) for
q
η
tp = T1η
1/3, θη = T2η2/3 and ϕη = T3η2/3 for any vector of
constants T1 > 0n+m , T2 > 0m and T3 > 0n .
The revenue loss due to stochasticity is O(η1/3) which is better
than the O(√η) loss in the fluid pricing policy in Section 4. Note
that, we can choose the constant factors T1, T2 and T3 carefully to
optimize the revenue loss even further.
Wewill now present two lemmas which will assist us in proving
the theorem. The first lemma shows that the CTMC parametrized
byη is positive recurrent and the expected queue length is bounded
which will be used later to bound the revenue loss.
Lemma 5.3. For a system of two-sided queues operating under Two
price policy and modified max-weight matching policy, the system is
positive recurrent for any θη > 0m , ϕ
η
> 0n and q
η
tp > 0m+n and
the expected queue length is bounded by the following equation:
E
[ 〈
θη , q(2)
〉
+
〈
ϕη , q(1)
〉 ]
≤
∑
j∈[m]
θ
η
j q
η(2)
tpj
P[q(2)j > q
η(2)
tpj
]
+
∑
i ∈[n]
ϕ
η
i q
(1)
tpi
P[q(1)i > q
η(1)
tpi
] + η 〈1m ,λ∗〉 + η 〈1n , µ∗〉 (20)
The proof of the lemma is presented in the Appendix F. How-
ever, we present a brief idea of the proof here for better understand-
ing of the reader.
Idea of the Proof. Sinceθη andϕη are greater than zero, when
the queue length of say, type j of customer or server is greater than
its certain threshold q
η
tpj
, the arrival rate of that type of customer
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decreases which leads to a drift towards 0. Therefore, we expect
that the system is positive recurrent.
We prove this using the Foster Lyapunov Theorem [24].We con-
sider a quadratic Lyapunov function in queue lengths and show
that the one step drift is negative outside a finite set of states. We
then we use the Moment Bound Theorem [10] to bound the ex-
pected queue length. 
Now we know that all the members in the family of CTMC are
positive recurrent. This is only possible when the arrival rates are
in the set C. Now, we will use this idea and present another lemma
which will be later used to eliminate terms in the revenue loss. The
lemma is presented below.
Lemma 5.4. For a system of two-sided queues operating under Two
price policy and max-weight matching policy, for any θη > 0m ,
ϕη > 0n and q
η
tp > 0m+n , we have∑
j∈[m]
(
F
′
j (λj )λj + Fj (λj )
)
θ
η
j P[q
(2)
j > q
η(2)
tpj
] =∑
i ∈[n]
(
G
′
i (µi )µi +Gi (µi )
)
ϕ
η
i P[q
(1)
i > q
η(1)
tpi
]
The proof of the lemma is deferred to Appendix G due to space
constraints. We will present a brief sketch of the proof here for
better understanding of the reader.
Idea of the Proof. We will use the fact that (λ∗, µ∗) is the op-
timal solution of the Fluid optimization problem. To prove this
lemma, we will use the first order optimality condition on the fluid
optimization problem which says that the directional derivative of
the objective function along a feasible direction is zero. We will use
the arrival rates of the two price policy as another feasible point
to find a feasible direction. Equating directional derivative to zero
gives us the lemma. 
We will now present the idea for the proof of Theorem 5.2 and
defer the details to Appendix H.
Idea of the Proof of Theorem 5.2. Wewill first upper bound
the revenue loss defined in (14), for the two price policy using Tay-
lor series expansion. We will then use Lemma 5.4 to eliminate first
order terms from the revenue loss and use Lemma 5.3 to bound the
expected queue length. Finally, we will substitute q
η
tp , θ
η and ϕη
in terms of η to get the result. 
Remark 3 (Practical Insights). From the previous two sections,
we can see that even a simple two-price dynamic pricing policy has
a much better performance than a static (fluid) pricing policy. It is
also practically easy to implement the two price policy. This shows
the advantage of dynamic price over static price. By Proposition 4.4,
the asymptotic performance of single link two sided queue is Θ(√η)
under fluid pricingpolicy.Also, by Theorem4.5 the asymptotic perfor-
mance of multiple link two sided queue is O(√η) under fluid pricing
policy and max-weight matching policy. Thus, by the idea of Remark
2, max-weight matching policy is close to optimal.
6 LP-based Approximation Algorithm
The Bellman equation for the MDP defined in the Section 2 can be
rewritten as an optimization problem [6].
min
(д,h)
д, subject to (21)
д ≥ R(q, z) + cEq,z[V (h,q, z)] − ch(q) ∀q, z ∈ S × Z (q), (22)
where R(., .) is defined in (6) and Eq,z[V (h,q, z)] is defined in (7).
It is difficult to solve this problem computationally, as we have
one constraint associated with each state-action pair in (22). Due
to the curse of dimensionality, the state space S will increase expo-
nentially with the customer and server types. Moreover, the action
space Z (q) contains continuous prices, so the action space is un-
countable. Of course, one can discretize the action space, but a fine
discretization may be needed to ensure numerical accuracy, which
also increases the computation burden.
Our proposed approach is to reduce the number of decision vari-
ables in the optimization problem by restricting the value func-
tion h(q) to some parametric form. This will lead to an optimiza-
tion where the number of decision variables is polynomial in cus-
tomer/server types. We can also use the original action space, so
the discretization step for the action space is not needed.
Throughout this section, we assume the queue length is bounded,
that is, S ⊆ {q : q ≤ 1m+nb} for some b < ∞.
6.1 Polynomial Approximation
Now, we will present the approximation of the value function.
Proposition 6.1. Approximating the value function h(q) with a
polynomial in q of degree r give by:
h(q) =
r∑
l=1
〈
bl , q
l
〉
, (23)
for some finite r ∈ Z+ and solving the optimization problem (21),
(22) gives an upper bound on the average revenue д. Here, bl is the
defined as the vector (b(1)
l1
, . . . ,b
(1)
ln
,b
(2)
l1
, . . . ,b
(2)
lm
) for all l ∈ [r ].
The proof is based on the analysis of the minimization problem
to solve the MDP. It uses the idea that if we minimize over a sub-
set of the feasible region, then it will lead to higher values of the
optimal objective function value and is deferred to Appendix I.
By approximating the value function by a polynomial of the
queue length of degree r , we have reduced the number of variables
in the optimization problem from bm+n to just (m + n) × r which
is linear in m and n if r is a constant. We will later see that this
approximation reduces the computational time drastically.
Also, as the degree of the polynomial increases, we consider a
more general case, and thus the upper bound we obtain on the
average revenue will be tighter as r increases. The system operator
can choose this r to balance the trade off between accuracy of the
solution and the computational time.
Another useful feature of this approximation is that, if we fix
a stationary matching policy x(q), then we can use the optimal-
ity equations for the Bellman equation (5) to compute the closed
form expression of the approximated pricing policy by solving the
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following differential equations:
(F (λj )λj )
′
+ h(q + e(2)j − x) − h(q) = 0 ∀j ∈ [m],
(G(µi )µi )
′
+ h(q + e(1)i − x) − h(q) = 0 ∀i ∈ [n].
These optimality equations are only valid when we are strictly in
the interior of the feasible region of the optimization problem, i.e.
λ > 0m and µ > 0n . Although, if there exists a q
(2)
j0
for which
λj (q(2)j0 ) = 0 then we can restrict our state space to q
(2)
j ≤ q
(2)
j0
as
the arrival rate of that type of customer for q
(2)
j0
is 0 and thus, it is
not possible to have q
(2)
j > q
(2)
j0
.
6.2 Constraint Generation
In this section, we present the constraint generation technique to
solve the optimization problem (21)-(22) after we have approxi-
mated the differential value function by a polynomial function in
q. The constraint generation algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 2 Constraint Generation
Initialization: b0
l
= 0, ∀l ∈ [r ],д0 = −∞,k = 0,ϵ = 10−6
2: Initialization: minд, constraints=ϕ Master Problem: (LP0)
while error > ϵ do
4: Tk (q, z)=R(q, z)+cEq,z
[ ∑r
l=1
〈
bk
l
,V (ql , z)
〉 ]
−c∑r
l=1
〈
bk
l
, ql
〉
for ∀ q ≤ b1m+n do
6: δk (q) = maxzTk (q, z) # Sub-Problem
if δk (q) ≤ дk then
8: continue
else
10: zk = argmaxzT
k (q, z)
constraints = +(д ≥ Tk (q, zk )) (LPk )
12: end if
end for
14: (дk+1, bk+1
l
∀l ∈ [r ]) = solve(LPk ) # Master-Problem
k=k+1
16: error = sup(дk+1 − дk , bk+1
l
− bk
l
, ∀l ∈ [r ])
end while
18: Output: д, bl , ∀l ∈ [r ]
We initialize the variables {bl , l ∈ [r ]}, which are the coeffi-
cients of the polynomial approximation of the value function and
the master LP with objective function “minд” and no constraints.
In each iteration, we find the most violating constraint for each q
by solving the following sub-problem
max
z∈Z (q)
R(q, z) + cEq,z
[ r∑
l=1
〈
bk
l
,V (ql , z)
〉 ]
− c
r∑
l=1
〈
bk
l
, ql
〉
, ∀q.
(24)
Note that, the sub-problem can be decomposed into multiple con-
vex optimization problem with respect to λ and µ. We then add
these most violating constraints to the master-problem. We then
solve the master-problem to get the updated values of bl ∀l ∈ [r ]
and д. This process is repeated until the following criterion is met:
sup(дk+1 − дk , bk+1
l
− bk
l
∀l ∈ [r ]) ≤ ϵ,
where k and k + 1 are successive iterates obtained by repeating the
constraint generation algorithm and ϵ is the allowable tolerance.
The computational efficiency of the constraint generation algo-
rithm can be further improved as follows: fix amatching policy and
only solve for the customer and server prices to get the most vio-
lating constraint. Now, the sub-problem (24) is to maximize with
respect to only customer and server arrival rates λ and µ. This will
become an unconstrained, convex optimization problemwhich can
be decomposed for the different customer and server arrival rates.
In the next section, we present a matching policy which can be
used for the same.
7 Simulation
In this section we will present simulation results to verify the the-
orems presented before and to show the structural properties of
the optimal pricing policies. We will only discuss the simulation
results for a single link two-sided queue as it is the simplest case
and will give us the most insight on the pricing policies.
First we present the input data to the model which is used to an-
alyze the system. For most of the results presented in this section,
we use a supply curve given byp1 = λ
0.5 and a demand curve given
by p2 = 4µ
−0.5. Solving the fluid solution, we get the fluid optimal
revenue of 3.08, when λ = µ = 43 and p1 = 1.15 and p2 = 3.46. For
most of the results, we cap the maximum queue length at 100 for
both customers and servers as experiments pointed out that the
expected queue length under optimal pricing policies is one order
less than that.
7.1 Optimal Pricing Policy
Firstly, we present the optimal pricing policy obtained by solving
the Average Reward, Continuous Time Markov Decision Process
using the Relative Value Iteration which gives us ϵ optimal solu-
tion where we specify the tolerance to be 10−4. The system is sim-
ulated for different values of the penalty coefficient of the waiting
customers and servers. Fig. 4 show the optimal pricing policy for
three different values of the penalty coefficient (s). Note that, as s
increases queue length is penalized more and so the price increases
more steeply as the number of customers and servers waiting in
the system increases. Also note that the customer price is always
above the server price and both of them are monotonic so that the
platform makes a profit on an average. It verifies the Theorem 3.1.
Also note that, when the system is empty, the customer and server
price matches the fluid prices as there is no penalty due to the wait-
ing and the revenue maximization problem is the fluid problem. As
the system has more customers, the customer price is increased to
reduce the inflow of the customers and server price is increased to
increase the inflow of servers to balance out the waiting customers
in the system. As s increases, more weight is given to the penalty
due to the waiting which leads to higher price in order to reduce
the average number of waiting customers and servers.
The average revenue under the optimal pricing policies for dif-
ferent values of s values is presented in Fig. 5. The average rev-
enue decreases with the increase of s as more penalty is imposed
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ferent values of penalty coefficients, s
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Figure 5: Optimal Average Revenue obtained by solving the
Average Cost MDP using the Relative Value Iteration for dif-
ferent values of penalty coefficients
for each waiting customer and server. Fig. 4 and Fig. 6 show that
as s increases, the optimal pricing policy becomes steeper and the
stationary distribution of the queue length is more concentrated
around 0.
7.2 Linear Approximation
Now, we will present the results obtained by approximating the
value function by a polynomial in the queue length and solving
the approximate Markov Decision Process using constraint gener-
ation.Wewould like to point out that the implementation of the ap-
proximate MDP using constraint generation takes 2 orders of time
less than solving the MDP using relative value iteration. Among
the multiple experiments conducted, relative value iteration took
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Figure 6: Stationary Distribution under different Optimal
Pricing Policy andExpectedQueue Lengths obtained by sim-
ulating the system
5 minutes on an average. On the other hand, approximated MDP
was solved under 10 seconds.
We will now compare the pricing policy obtained by linear and
quadratic approximation of the value function with that of the op-
timal pricing policy. As seen in Fig. 7 and 8, for different values
of s , the approximate pricing policy is a good first order approxi-
mation to the optimal pricing policy and with increasing the order
of the polynomial, it results in a better fit. The linear approxima-
tion itself results in a way better fit than the fluid solution which
gives only a static policy. We would also like to point out that by
approximating the value function and solving for the unknown co-
efficients, results in a closed form expression of the pricing policy.
Although, the shape of the approximate policy is sensitive to the
function used to approximate the value function and the fit with
the optimal pricing policy depends on the system parameters.
We compare the approximation of the value function by a lin-
ear function in queue length with the exact value function approx-
imated as a linear function using regression. The comparison is
summarized in Table 1. The value function departs from a linear
function to a more non linear function with increasing s which
leads to increasing mismatch between the exact and approximated
value function. Thus, the percentage error between the intercept
and slope increases with the increasing value of s .
Moreover, we also compare the two by considering linear supply
and demand curve. In particular, we consider the supply curve to
be p1 = µ and p2 = 5 − λ. The comparison is summarized in Table
2. Observe that the percentage error is less in the case of linear
supply and demand curve, which shows that the quality of the fit
depends on the system parameters.
In both the cases, we can also see that the average revenue (д)
obtained by solving the approximated MDP results in an upper
bound on the revenue obtained by solving the exact MDP. This
verifies the Proposition 6.1.
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7.3 Asymptotic Analysis
We compute the revenue loss under the fluid pricing policy and
two price policy and compare it with the theoretical result pre-
sented before and also with the exact solution obtained by solving
the MDP. The revenue loss under the fluid pricing policy follows√
η and that under the two price policy follows η1/3, verifying the
Theorem 4.5 and Theorem 5.2. Also observe that the revenue loss
Cons. Generation Value Iteration+Fit % Error
s c0 c1 д c0 c1 д c0 c1
0.01 -1.73 -0.007 3.07 -1.69 -0.008 3.03 2% 10%
0.02 -1.73 -0.010 3.07 -1.80 -0.013 3.03 4% 25%
0.05 -1.73 -0.013 3.06 -1.89 -0.019 3.03 9% 34%
0.1 -1.73 -0.014 3.06 -2.05 -0.025 2.95 16% 43%
0.2 -1.73 -0.016 3.06 -2.59 -0.034 2.8 24% 53%
0.5 -1.73 -0.017 3.06 -2.59 -0.051 2.48 33% 67%
Table 1: Comparison of Constraint Generation Algorithm
with the optimal pricing policy with log-log supply and de-
mand curve
Cons. Generation Value Iteration+Fit % Error
s c0 c1 д c0 c1 д c0 c1
0.01 -0.014 -2.49 3.11 -0.016 -2.51 3.06 12% 1%
0.02 -0.020 -2.49 3.10 -0.023 -2.51 3.02 13% 1%
0.05 -0.032 -2.48 3.09 -0.037 -2.52 2.93 14% 1%
0.1 -0.048 -2.48 3.07 -0.054 -2.53 2.81 12% 2%
0.2 -0.071 -2.46 3.04 -0.081 -2.55 2.63 12% 3%
0.5 -0.121 -2.44 2.98 -0.144 -2.58 2.24 16% 5%
Table 2: Comparison of Constraint Generation Algorithm
with the optimal pricing policy with linear supply and de-
mand curve
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Figure 9: Performance of Two Price policy and Fluid Pricing
Policy compared to the exact solution obtained by solving
the MDP as η → ∞
under the two price policy is not very different from that of the op-
timal revenue loss, demonstrating the effectiveness of a two price
policy.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a model of dynamic pricing and match-
ing in a two-sided queueing system. We modeled it as an MDP,
and presented an approximation framework and constraint gener-
ation algorithm. Next, we presented a fluid pricing andmax-weight
matching policy, and showed that it achievesO(√η) optimality rate.
Furthermore, we proposed a dyanmic pricing and modified max-
weight policy, which achieves O(η1/3) optimality rate. Our simu-
lation results is consistent with our theoretical findings and show
additional insights into the structure of the optimal policy.
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A Uniformized Discrete Time MDP
We define an arrival and matching process for the UDT-MDP. Let
a(k) ∈ {0, 1}m+n be an arrival process, which represents the ar-
rival of the customers and servers as we have one transition in the
uniformized process. In each period of UDT-MDP, there is at most
one customer or server arrival. The arriving probability is given
by
As the probability of having multiple arrivals at the same time
for a continuous time process is zero, at most one component of
a(k) will be non zero. Thus, the arrival process has the following
distribution:
a(k) =

e
(2)
j w.p.
λj (q(k))
c , ∀j ∈ [m]
e
(1)
i w.p.
µi (q(k))
c , ∀i ∈ [n]
0m+n w.p. 1 − 〈1m,λ(q(k))〉+〈1n,µ(q(k))〉c .
Every time the system state changes, the operator is allowed to
match customers and servers. Thus, we define the service process
x˜ as follows:
x˜(k) =
{
x(q(k) + a(k)) if a(k) , 0m+n
0 if a(k) = 0m+n .
With an abuse of notation, we use x(k) to represent x(q(k)+ a(k)).
Now we have defined an arrival process and a service process (
matching decisions) of the two-sided queuing system. For the ease
of notation, we define vectors of the queue lengths, arrival and
service process as
q =
©­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­«
q
(1)
1
q
(1)
2
.
.
.
q
(1)
n
q
(2)
1
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(2)
m
ª®®®®®®®®®®®®®®®®¬
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n
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1
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The queue length advancement equation is the relation between
the queue length before a transition q(k) and the queue length after
a transition q(k + 1) in the UDT-MDP. We have
q(k + 1) = q(k) − x˜(k) + a(k). (26)
Rather than keeping track of the trajectory of the queue length of
the continuous process, it suffices to keep track of the queue length
for the uniformized discrete time process. We will work with this
discrete time process in the following sections.
B Proof of Theorem 3.1
The optimal customer and server pricing policy is obtained by solv-
ing the Bellman equation given by (8).
We will first show that the difference of the optimal value func-
tion, ∆h(q) = h(q) − h(q − 1) is monotonically decreasing in q.
We will use the relative value iteration algorithm to compute the
value function and show that in every iteration, the value function
is monotonic where the value function at the end of kth iteration
is denoted by hk (q). The relative value iteration does the following
computation:
hk+1(q) = max
µ≥0,λ≥0
[
F (λ)λ −G(µ)µ
c
− s |q |
c
− д
c
+
λ
c
hk (q+1)
+
(
1 − µ + λ
c
)
hk (q) +
µ
c
hk (q − 1)
]
− hk (q0) ∀q ∈ S,
for some q0 ∈ S . Also, the Bellman equation can be rewritten using
∆h(q) as follows:
д = max
µ≥0,λ≥0
[
F (λ)λ −G(µ)µ − s |q | + λ∆h(q + 1) − µ∆h(q)
]
.
Now we will first present a lemma which is essential to prove the
Theorem 3.1.
Lemma B.1. The optimal difference of value function ∆h∗(q) is
monotonically decreasing in q.
Proof. The proof by induction is presented below:
BaseCase:Aswe can start with any initial value function to imple-
ment relative value iteration algorithm, we pick a monotonically
decreasing difference of value function ∆h0(q) in q.
Induction Hypothesis:Assume that ∆hk (q) is monotonically de-
creasing in q.
Induction Step:Wewill now calculate∆hk+1(q+2)−∆hk+1(q+1)
and show that it is always non negative. We have,
c∆hk+1(q + 2) − c∆hk+1(q + 1)
= c (hk+1(q + 2) − 2hk+1(q + 1) + hk+1(q))
∗
= c∆hk (q + 2) − c∆hk (q + 1) +
{
λ∗(q + 2)∆hk (q + 3) − µ∗(q + 2)×
∆hk (q + 2) + R(µ∗(q + 2), λ∗(q + 2))
}
− 2
{
λ∗(q + 1)∆hk (q + 2)
− µ∗(q + 1)∆hk (q + 1) + R(µ∗(q + 1), λ∗(q + 1))
}
+
+
{
λ∗(q)∆hk(q + 1) − µ∗(q)∆hk (q) + R(µ∗(q),λ∗(q))
}
, (27)
where (∗) follows from the Bellman equationwhereR(µ∗(q),λ∗(q))
is the reward given by F (λ)λ − G(µ)µ − s |q | and (λ∗(q0), µ∗(q0))
maximizes the Bellman equation (8) for q = q0. As (λ∗(q0), µ∗(q0))
maximizes (8) for q = q0, we have:
R(µ∗(q + 1),λ∗(q + 1)) + λ∗(q + 1)∆hk (q + 2) − µ∗(q + 1)×
∆hk (q + 1) ≥ R(µ∗(q + i), λ∗(q + i)) + λ∗(q + i)∆hk (q + 2)
− µ∗(q + i)∆hk (q + 1) ∀i ∈ {0, 2}. (28)
Using, (28) to simplify (27) we get,
c∆hk+1(q + 2) − c∆hk+1(q + 1) ≤ λ∗(q + 2)
(
∆hk (q + 3)
− ∆hk (q + 2)
)
+ (c− µ∗(q + 2) − λ∗(q))(∆hk (q + 2) − ∆hk (q + 1))
+ µ∗(q)(∆hk (q + 1) − ∆hk (q)) ∗≤ 0 ∀q ∈ S (29)
As c = λmax + µmax , we have c − µ∗(q + 2) − λ∗(q) ≥ 0 for all
q and by Induction hypothesis, ∆hk (q + 1) − ∆hk (q) ≤ 0 for all
q. Thus, (∗) follows. This proves the lemma as relative value itera-
tion preserves the monotonic behaviour of the value function and
it converges to the optimal value and as the point-wise limit of
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monotonically decreasing functions is monotonically decreasing,
∆h(q) is monotonically decreasing and so h(q) is concave. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. By Assumption 2, the domain of F is
[0, λmax ] and the domain of G is [0, µmax ] and by Assumption 1,
the equation we are maximizing in (8) is continuous and by As-
sumption 2 is it concave. Thus, we are maximizing a continuous
concave function over a compact set. Thus, the maximizer exists
and any point is a maximizer if and only if it satisfies the first order
necessary condition.
First we will show that if λ∗(q0) = 0 then λ∗(q) = 0 for all q > q0
is an optimal decision rule. If λ∗(q0) = 0, then we have:
F (λ)λ + ∆h(q0)λ ≤ 0 ∀λ ∈ [0, λmax ]
F (λ)λ + ∆h(q0)λ + (∆h(q0+k) − ∆h(q0)) λ ≤ (∆h(q0+k)− ∆h(q0)) λ
F (λ)λ + ∆h(q0 + k)
∗≤ 0 ∀λ ∈ [0, λmax ] ∀k
where (∗) follows as ∆h is monotonically decreasing in q. The
above inequality says that maximum value of F (λ)λ + ∆h(q0 + k)λ
is zero for all k ≥ 1, thus, λ = 0 is an optimizer for that. Now we
will similarly show that if λ(q0) = λmax then λ(q) = λmax for all
q < q0 is an optimal decision rule. We have,
F (λ)λ + ∆h(q0)λ ≤ F (λmax )λmax + ∆h(q0)λmax ∀λ ∈ [0, λmax ].
Now, adding (∆h(q0 − k) − ∆h(q0)) λ for some k > 0, we get:
F (λ)λ + ∆h(q0 − k)λ ≤ F (λmax )λmax + ∆h(q0)λmax
+ (∆h(q0 − k) − ∆h(q0)) λ ∀λ ∈ [0, λmax ] ∀k ≥ 1
∗⇒ F (λ)λ + ∆h(q0 − k)λ ≤ F (λmax )λmax + ∆h(q0 − k)λmax
∀λ ∈ [0, λmax ] ∀k ≥ 1,
where (∗) follows as λmax ≥ λ. Thus, λ(q) = λmax will be an
optimal decision rule for all q < q0. Thus, once the customer rate
reaches it’s maximum or minimum value, in the maximization
problem (8), it’ll stay constantly that throughout.
Similarly, we can show that if µ∗(q0) = µmax then µ(q) = µmax
for all q ≥ q0 is an optimal pricing policy and if µ∗(q0) = 0 then
µ(q) = 0 for all q ≤ q0 is an optimal pricing policy. As it is quite
repetitive, we omit the details here.
Now, we will use the optimality condition for the optimization
problem given by (8) when the optimal arrival rates are strictly in
the interior of the constraint region, i.e. λmax > λ
∗(q) > 0 and
µmax > µ
∗(q) > 0. We have,
[F (λ∗(q))λ∗(q)]′ + ∆h(q + 1) =0 (30)
[G(µ∗(q))µ∗(q)]′ + ∆h(q) =0, (31)
where the gradient of the LHS is taken with respect to λ and µ
respectively, which in turn depends on q. The gradient is well de-
fined as F and G are continuous differentiable functions by As-
sumption 1. As ∆h(q) is monotonically decreasing in q by Lemma
B.1, we have that (r (2)(λ∗))′ = [F (λ∗(q))λ∗(q)]′ and (r (1)(µ∗))′ =
[G(µ∗(q))µ∗(q)]′ are monotonically increasing. By Assumption 2,
r (2)(λ∗(q)) is concave in λ∗ and r (1)(µ∗(q)) is convex in µ∗ . Thus, λ∗
should be monotonically decreasing in q and µ∗ should be mono-
tonically increasing in q when λ∗ > 0 and µ∗ > 0 respectively.
Thus, λ∗(q)will be monotonically decreasing for all q and as the
demand curve is monotonically decreasing by Assumption 1, the
customer price (p(2))∗(q) will be monotonically increasing.
Thus, µ∗(q) will be monotonically increasing for all q and as
the supply curve is monotonically increasing by Assumption 1, the
server price (p(1))∗(q) will be monotonically increasing.

C Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Under a given pricing and matching policy, if E[q(k)j ] =
∞ for some k, j ∈ {1} × [m] ∪ {2} × [n], then R(q, z) = −∞ and
the theorem is trivially true as the optimal objective function value
(9) is greater than or equal to 0 as λ˜ = 0m and µ˜ = 0n is a trivial
feasible solution of the fluid optimization problem.
Wewill first show the following claim holds true and then prove
the Theorem.
Claim C.1. For any stationary pricing and matching policy under
which the system is stable and E[q(k)j ] < ∞ for all k, j ∈ {1} × [m] ∪
{2} × [n], the constraints in the fluid LP (10) (11) (12) are necessary
but not sufficient conditions.
Recall that we are interested in policies under which our CTMC
is irreducible containing the state zero. Thus, if under a pricing and
matching policy the system is stable, then we can use stationarity
to write:
E[q(k + 1)] = E[q(k)]
where the expectation is with respect to the stationary distribution
of the CTMC or equivalently the uniformized DTMC. Now, using
(26), we can simplify the above equation to write:
E[a(k)] = E[x˜(k)]. (32)
We have cE[a(k)] = cE
[
Eq(k)[a(k)]
]
= E[(λ(q), µ(q))] = (λ˜, µ˜),
where λ(q) and µ(q) are the arrival rates under the given pricing
policy. By (1) (2) and (3), there exists xi j (k) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and
j ∈ [m] and k ∈ Z+ such that,
x˜
(2)
j (k) =
n∑
i=1
x˜i j (k) ≤ q(2)j (k) ∀j ∈ [m],
x˜
(1)
i (k) =
m∑
j=1
x˜i j (k) ≤ q(1)i (k) ∀i ∈ [n],
x˜i j (k) = 0 ∀(i, j) < E,
where x˜i j = xi j if a(k) , 0m+n and 0 otherwise. Note that since
the matching policy is stationary, the expectation of the matching
decision will not depend on k . Taking expectation on both sides
with respect to the stationary distribution and defining E[x˜i j (k)] =
χi j , we have
E
[
x˜
(2)
j (k)
]
=
n∑
i=1
χi j (k) ≤ E
[
q
(2)
j (k)
]
< ∞ ∀j ∈ [m],
E
[
x˜
(1)
i (k)
]
=
m∑
j=1
χi j (k) ≤ E
[
q
(1)
i (k)
]
< ∞ ∀i ∈ [n],
χi j (k) = 0 ∀(i, j) < E.
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Now substituting a and x˜ in (32), we get (10) (11) and (12). Thus, for
any pricing and matching policy under which the system is stable,
the constraints in the fluid LP are necessary but not sufficient.
Now, by ergodic theorem for Markov chains, the long run av-
erage reward converges to E[R(q, z)]. Note that the Uniformized
DTMC is aperiodic as we will always have transition from a state
back to itself because of uniformization. Also, we haveE[R(q, z)] ≤
E[〈F (λ),λ〉−〈G(µ), µ〉] ≤
〈
F (λ˜), λ˜
〉
−〈G(µ˜), µ˜〉 for any pricing and
matching policy,where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s In-
equality and Assumption 2. Thus, the optimal fluid objective func-
tion value provides an upper bound for the average revenue under
any stationary pricing and matching policy. Now, from the MDP
theory, we know that there exists an optimal stationary policy and
the fluid problem provides an upper bound for any stationary pol-
icy. Thus, fluid problem provides an upper bound for any arbitrary
pricing and matching policy. Thus, the theorem follows. 
D Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Under the fluid pricing policy, the
steady state distribution of q(1) − q(2) is uniform as it behaves like
a symmetric simple random walk. Thus, the expected value of the
sum of queue length (q(1) + q(2)) can be computed in terms of the
buffer capacity q
η
max as follows:
E[q(1)(k) + q(2)(k)] = E[|q(1)(k) − q(2)(k)|] (33)
=
q
η
max (qηmax + 1)
2q
η
max + 1
(34)
∗≈ qηmax/2 (35)
where (∗) is an approximation at large values of qmax . We can also
write the steady state probability of q(1) = qmax and q(2) = qmax
by using the fact that the steady state queue length distribution is
uniform across the state.
P[q(1) = qηmax ] =
1
2q
η
max + 1
(36)
P[q(2) = qηmax ] =
1
2q
η
max + 1
(37)
Now, we can evaluate the revenue loss by using (14) as follows:
Lη =
F (λ∗)λ∗ −G(µ∗)µ∗
2q
η
max + 1
η + s
q
η
max (qηmax + 1)
2q
η
max + 1
(38)
Clearly, by (38), the asymptotic revenue loss is optimal when the
buffer is scaled as q
η
max = γ
√
η for some constant γ . To expound,
if q
η
max = γη
0.5+ϵ for some ϵ > 0, the due to the second term,
R
η
l
= Θ(η0.5+ϵ ). On the other hand if qηmax = γη0.5−ϵ for some
ϵ > 0, then due to the first term, R
η
l
= Θ(η0.5+ϵ ).
As (38) holds with equality, the optimal revenue loss is Θ(√η).
The proposition follows. 
E Proof of Theorem 4.5
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Wewill bound each of the terms in (14).
In order to bound the first term, define a function of queue lengths
V (q) = ∑j (q(2)j )2. Now, we will calculate QηV (q) where Qη is the
transition rate matrix of the ηth CTMC operating under the Fluid
pricing policy and max-weight matching policy.
QηV (q)
=
∑
j
ηλ∗j
[ ∑
j
′ ∈[m]/j
(q(2)
j
′ )2 + (q(2)j + (1 −
∑
i
y
(2)
i j )1q(2)j <qη(2)maxj )
2
]
+
∑
i
ηµ∗i
[∑
j
(q(2)j − y
(1)
i j )2
]
−
[∑
i
ηµ∗i +
∑
j
ηλ∗j
] ∑
j
(q(2)j )2
(a)
=
∑
j
ηλ∗j (1−
∑
i
y
(2)
i j )(1+2q
(2)
j )1q(2)j <qη(2)maxj
+
∑
i
ηµ∗i
∑
j
y
(1)
i j (1−2q
(2)
j )
(b )≤
∑
i
ηµ∗i +
∑
j
ηλ∗j + 2
[∑
j
ηλ∗jq
(2)
j (1 −
∑
i
y
(2)
i j )1q(2)j <qη(2)maxj
−
∑
i
ηµ∗i
∑
j
q
(2)
j y
(1)
i j
]
(c)
=
∑
i
ηµ∗i +
∑
j
ηλ∗j +2
[∑
j
ηλ∗jq
(2)
j 1q
(2)
j <q
η(2)
maxj
1
{
max
i
′ ∈N (j ) q
(1)
i
′ =0
}
−
∑
i
ηµ∗i
(
max
j
′ ∈N (i )
q
(2)
j
′
) ]
(d )
= 2
∑
(i, j)∈E
ηχ∗i j
[
1+q
(2)
j 1q
(2)
j <q
η(2)
maxj
1
{
max
i
′ ∈N (j ) q
(1)
i
′ =0
}− max
j
′ ∈N (i )
q
(2)
j
′
]
,
where (a) follows as (y(1)i j )2 = y
(1)
i j as y
(1)
i j ∈ {0, 1}. Also, (1 −∑
i y
(2)
i j )2 = 1 −
∑
i y
(2)
i j as
∑
i y
(2)
i j ∈ {0, 1}. Next, (b) follows from
the fact that (1−∑i y(2)i j ) ≤ 1 for all j ∈ [m] and ∑j y(1)i j ≤ 1 for all
i ∈ [n] which is because there can be at most one arrival between
two successive decision epochs and we only match the arriving
customers and servers, i.e. we only match at most one pair in each
time epoch. Now, (c) follows from the max-weight matching algo-
rithm 1 and (d) follows as λ∗, µ∗ ∈ C, there exists a χ = χ ∗ such
that λ∗, µ∗, χ ∗ satisfies (10), (11),(12). As q ≤ qηmax , V (q) is finite
for all permissible values of q. Moreover,E[V (q)] is finite and so the
family of CTMC for all η are positive recurrent. Suppose q¯ denotes
the steady state queue length vector. Taking expectation with re-
spect to the steady state distribution of q, we have E[QV (q¯)] = 0.
So, we have
0 ≤
∑
(i, j)∈E
χi j
[
1 + E
[
q¯
(2)
j 1q¯
(2)
j <q¯
η(2)
maxj
1
max
i
′ ∈N (j ) q¯
(1)
i
′ =0
]
− E
[
max
j
′ ∈N (i )
q¯
(2)
j
′
]]
∗≤
∑
(i, j)∈E
χi j
[
1 + E
[
q¯
(2)
j
] − π (q¯η(2)max j )q¯η(2)max j − E[ max
j
′ ∈N (i )
q¯
(2)
j
′
] ]
∗∗≤
∑
(i, j)∈E
χi j
[
1 − π (q¯η(2)max j )q¯
η(2)
max j
]
=
∑
j
λ∗j −
∑
j
λ∗jπ (q¯
η(2)
max j )q¯
η(2)
max j . (39)
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where (∗) follows from the inequality 1
max
i
′ ∈N (j ) q¯
(1)
i
′ =0
≤ 1 for all
q¯ and (∗∗) follows from the inequality maxj′ ∈N (i ) q¯
(2)
j
′ ≥ q¯(2)j for
all j such that (i, j) ∈ E. By substituting q¯ηmax = γ√η in (39) for an
arbitrary vector of constants γ , we get:
√
η
∑
j
γjλ
∗
jπ (q¯
η(2)
max j ) ≤
∑
j
λ∗j ,
∑
j
Fj (λ∗j )λ∗jπ (q¯
η(2)
max j ) ≤
1√
η
max
j∈[m]
Fj (λ∗j )
γj
∑
j
λ∗j . (40)
Thus, we have
〈
F (λ∗),λ∗π (qηmax )
〉
isO(1/√η). Nowwewill bound
the penalty term due to the expected queue length below:
The state space of the CTMC is such that for any state q, we
have q ≤ qηmax . Thus, it is trivially true that 〈1m+n ,E[q]〉 ≤〈
1, q
η
max
〉
=
√
η
〈
1,γ
〉
. Thus we can upper bound the revenue loss
Lη by using (14) as follows:
R
η
l
≤ √η
(
max
j∈[m]
Fj (λ∗j )
γj
∑
j
λ∗j +
〈
1,γ
〉 )
= O(√η) (41)
So, the proof follows. 
F Proof of Lemma 5.3
Proof of Lemma 5.3. We start by defining two Lyapunov Func-
tions as,
V (1)(q) =
〈
1n , (q(1))2
〉
and V (2)(q) =
〈
1m , (q(2))2
〉
.
Now, we will calculate the drift of V (2)(.) for the ηth CTMC as
follows:
QηV (2)(q)
=
∑
j
(ηλ∗j − θ
η
j 1q
(2)
j >q
η(2)
tpj
)
(
(q(2)j + 1 −
∑
i
y
(2)
i j )2 − (q
(2)
j )2
)
+
∑
i
(ηµ∗i − ϕ
η
i 1q
(1)
i >q
η(1)
tpi
)
∑
j
(
(q(2)j − y
(1)
i j )2 − (q
(2)
j )2
)
(a)
=
∑
j
(ηλ∗j − θ
η
j 1q
(2)
j >q
η(2)
tpj
)(1 −
∑
i
y
(2)
i j )(1 + 2q
(2)
j )
+
∑
i
(ηµ∗i − ϕ
η
i 1q
(1)
i >q
η(1)
tpi
)
∑
j
y
(1)
i j (1 − 2q
(2)
j )
(b )≤ η 〈1m ,λ∗〉 + η 〈1n , µ∗〉 + 2∑
j
ηλ∗j (1 −
∑
i
y
(2)
i j )q
(2)
j
− 2
∑
i
ηµ∗i
∑
j
y
(1)
i j q
(2)
j − 2
∑
j
θ
η
j (1 −
∑
i
y
(2)
i j )q
(2)
j 1q
(2)
j >q
η(2)
tpj
+ 2
∑
i
ϕ
η
i
∑
j
y
(1)
i j q
(2)
j 1q
(1)
i >q
η(1)
tpi
(c)
= η
〈
1m ,λ
∗〉
+ η
〈
1n , µ
∗〉
+ 2
∑
j
ηλ∗jq
(2)
j 1tp
i
′ ∈N ∗(j )q
(1)
i
′ =0
−2
∑
i
ηµ∗i max
j
′ ∈N ∗(i )
q
(2)
j
′ −2
∑
j
θ
η
j q
(2)
j 1q
(2)
j >q
η(2)
tpj
1
{
max
i
′ ∈N ∗(j ) q
(1)
i
′ =0
}
+ 2
∑
i
ϕ
η
i max
j
′ ∈N ∗(i )
q
(2)
j
′ 1q(1)i >q
η(1)
tpi
(42)
(d )
= η
〈
1m ,λ
∗〉
+ η
〈
1n , µ
∗〉
+ 2η
∑
i, j∈E∗
χ∗i j
(
q
(2)
j 1
{
max
i
′ ∈N ∗(j ) q
(1)
i
′ =0
}
− max
j
′ ∈N ∗(i )
q
(2)
j
′
)
− 2
∑
j
θ
η
j q
(2)
j 1q
(2)
j >q
η(2)
tpj
(e )≤ η 〈1m ,λ∗〉 + η 〈1n , µ∗〉 − 2∑
j
θ
η
j q
(2)
j 1q
(2)
j >q
η(2)
tpj
. (43)
Under the modifiedmax-weight matching policy, if any of the com-
patible counterparts’ queue (according to E∗) of the arrival is non
empty, we match it with the type with most number of waiting
customers/ servers. Thus, we will have
∑
i y
(2)
i j and y
(1)
i j for all j to
be either 1 or 0. Thus, we will have (1−∑i y(2)i j )2 = 1−∑i y(2)i j and
(y(1)i j )2 = y
(1)
i j . Thus, ((a)) follows.
We have ηλ∗j −θ
η
j 1q
(2)
j >q
η(2)
tpj
< ηλ∗j as θj > 0 and 1−
∑
i y
(2)
i j ≤ 1.
We also have thatηµ∗i −ϕ
η
i 1q
(1)
i >q
η(1)
tpi
< ηµ∗i asϕi > 0 and
∑
j y
(1)
i j ≤
1. Using these inequalities, ((b)) follows.
Now, ((c)) follows from the Algorithm 1, as we match whenever
any of the compatible counterparts’ queue in the minimal capacity
serving graph is empty and we match it to the queue with maxi-
mum number of customers/servers waiting.
We can have q
(1)
i > q
η(1)
tpi
> 0, if and only if the queues of all the
compatible counterparts of i in minimal capacity serving graphs
are empty as we match immediately whenever there is an arrival.
Thus, the last term in (42) is 0 and thus, ((d)) follows. We also use
the definition of the capacity region and the fact that λ∗, µ∗ ∈ CE∗
+
in this step.
Lastly, (e) follows as the last term is zero when χ∗i j = 0 and we
have j ∈ N ∗(i) when χ∗i j > 0 and thus, q
(2)
j ≤ maxj′ ∈N ∗(i ) q
(2)
j
′ .
Now, we can similarly upper bound the drift of V (1)(q). We have:
QηV (1)(q) ≤ η 〈1m ,λ∗〉 + η 〈1n , µ∗〉 − 2∑
i
ϕ
η
i q
(1)
i 1q
(1)
i >q
η(1)
tpi
.
(44)
Now, if we add (43) and (44), we will have an upper bound on the
drift of the Lyapunov function V (q) = V (1)(q) +V (2)(q) to be:
QηV (q) ≤ B − 2
∑
i
ϕ
η
i q
(1)
i 1q
(1)
i >q
η(1)
tpi
− 2
∑
j
θ
η
j q
(2)
j 1q
(2)
j >q
η(2)
tpj
,
Where, B = 2η
〈
1m ,λ
∗〉
+ 2η 〈1n , µ∗〉. Now consider the following
set:
B =
{
q : q(1) ≤ max{ B
ϕη
, q
η(1)
tp },q(2) ≤ max{
B
θη
, q
η(2)
tp }
}
.
Outside the finite set B, the drift of the Lyapunov functionV (q) is
strictly less than zero. We have:
QηV (1)(q) +QηV (2)(q) ≤ −B < 0 ∀q ∈ Bc .
Thus, the system is positive recurrent for any η and the first part of
the lemma follows. Now, we will use the moment bound theorem
to upper bound the expectation of the sum of the queue lengths to
Varma et al.
get the desired inequality. We have,
E
[∑
i
ϕ
η
i q
(1)
i 1q
(1)
i >q
η(1)
tpi
+
∑
j
θ
η
j q
(2)
j 1q
(2)
j >q
η(2)
tpj
]
≤ B
2
.
By substituting 1
q(1)>qη(1)tp
= 1 − 1
q(1)≤qη(1)tp
and then bounding the
RHS by using the inequality E[q(1)i 1q(1)i ≤q(1)tpi
] ≤ q(1)tpi , we get the
lemma. 
G Proof of Lemma 5.4
Before proving the lemma, we first prove the following claim:
Claim G.1. Consider a pricing and matching policy and assume
the following:
• The multiple link two sided queue is positive recurrent
• E[〈1m+n , q〉] < ∞ under the given policy
• The pricing policy is of the following form:
λ˜j = ηλ
∗
+ f˜j (q,η) ∀j ∈ [m] (45)
µ˜i = ηµ
∗
i + д˜i (q,η) ∀i ∈ [n], (46)
• The matching policy only uses edges E∗ from the minimal ca-
pacity serving graph to match.
Then we have ∑
j∈[m]
(
F
′
j (λj )λj + Fj (λj )
)
E[ f˜ (q,η)] =∑
i ∈[n]
(
G
′
i (µi )µi +Gi (µi )
)
E[д˜(q,η)].
Proof of the Claim. First, we will define a vector χ¯ of dimen-
sion R(mn)×1 given a matrix χ of dimension Rn×m as follows:
χ¯k = χi j where i = ⌈
k
m
⌉ j = k%(m + 1) ∀k ∈ [mn],
where ⌈x⌉ is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x and
x%(n + 1) is the reminder obtained by dividing x ∈ Z+ by (n + 1).
In other words, χ¯ is a vector obtained by stacking all the rows of
the χ matrix next to each other.
By the hypothesis of the claim, the system is positive recurrent.
Also, by the Claim C.1, we know that the constraints (10) (11) (12)
are necessarily satisfied for the pricing and matching policy un-
der which the system is positive recurrent and E[〈1m+n , q〉] < ∞.
Thus, for the arrival rate vector (λ˜, µ˜), there exists a correspond-
ing average rate assignment vector χ¯p corresponding to the rate
assignment matrix χp such that the constraints which define the
set CE
∗
, which is the same as the constraints (10) (11) (12) is sat-
isfied. Note that, by the hypothesis of the claim, we only use the
edges in the graph E∗ to match, χi j = 0 for all (i, j) < E∗.
Now we restate the fluid problem originally defined in (9) (11)
(10) (12) below:
max f (λ, µ, χ¯ ) = 〈F (λ),λ〉 − 〈G(µ), µ〉
subject to,
h
(2)
j (λ, µ, χ¯ ) = λj −
∑
k :k%(m+1)=j
χ¯k = 0 ∀j ∈ [m],
h
(1)
i (λ, µ, χ¯ ) = µi −
∑
k :⌈k/m⌉=i
χ¯k = 0 ∀i ∈ [n],
χ¯k = 0 ∀(⌈k/m⌉,k%(m + 1)) < E, χ¯k ≥ 0 ∀(⌈k/m⌉,k%(m + 1)) ∈ E.
As (λ˜, µ˜) ∈ CE∗ , there exists a corresponding average rate assign-
ment vector χ¯p ∈ Rn×m
+
corresponding to the average rate assign-
ment matrix χp , that comes from the given pricing policy (45), (46)
andmatching policy such that χ
p
i j = 0∀(i, j) < E∗ and h(λ˜, µ˜, χp ) =
0m+n . Here we define h : R
m+n+mn → Rm+n as
h(.) = (h(2)1 (.),h
(2)
2 (.), . . .h
(2)
m ,h
(1)
1 (.), . . .h
(1)
n (.))
which is the concatenation all the equality constraints.
Note that as CE
∗ ⊆ CE , we have (λ˜, µ˜) ∈ CE . Also, as (λ∗, µ∗) ∈
C
E∗
+
there exists χ ∗ ∈ Rn×m
+
such that χ∗i j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E∗, χ∗i j >
0∀(i, j) ∈ E∗ and h(λ∗, µ∗, χ¯ ∗) = 0m+n .
To prove the theorem, we will use the optimality condition for
the fluid problem (9) (11) (10) (12) as (λ∗, µ∗, χ ∗) is an optimal so-
lution to this problem. We will do the following steps:
• First we will argue that the optimal point (λ∗, µ∗, χ ∗) is reg-
ular, i.e. the constraints tight at the optimal point are lin-
early independent.
• Then we will use the arrival rates of the given price policy
to find a feasible direction for the fluid problem
• Finally, wewill use the first order KKToptimality conditions
and use the condition χ∗i j > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E∗ to eliminate
the non negativity constraints as none of them are tight at
the optimal point.
The gradients of the active constraints at the optimal point of
the fluid problem (λ∗, µ∗, χ ∗) are linearly independent as the con-
straints h(λ, µ, χ ) and the non negativity constraints are linear and
it can be easily verified that the normal vectors to the hyper planes
and half spaces corresponding to these constraints are linearly in-
dependent.
So, the optimal point is regular and thus, there exists unique
Lagrangian multipliers (κ∗, ξ ∗) ∈ Rm+n × Rm×n
+
such that,
∇ f (λ∗, µ∗, χ¯ ∗) + ∇h(λ∗, µ∗, χ¯ ∗)κ∗
+
∑
k :( ⌈k/m⌉,k%(m+1))∈E
ξ ∗k ek+n+m1 χ¯ ∗k=0 +
∑
k :( ⌈k/m⌉,k%(m+1))<E
ξ ∗k ek+n+m
= 0m+n+mn , (47)
where f (λ∗, µ∗, χ ∗) ∈ Rm+n+mn is given by
∇ f (λ∗, µ∗, χ ∗) = (F ′(λ∗)λ∗ + F (λ∗),−G′(µ∗)µ∗ −G(µ∗), 0nm ).
Also, as h : Rm+n+mn → Rm+n , the gradient ∇h(λ∗, µ∗, χ¯ ∗) is
a matrix in R(m+n+mn)×(m+n) where each column corresponds to
the the gradient of the equality constraints h
(2)
j for all j ∈ [m] and
h
(1)
i for all i ∈ [n]. Finally, we define ek+n+m ∈ Rm+n+m×n as a
vectorwith all components zero except the (k+n+m)th component.
Nowwe define a vector d ∈ Rn+m+mn which is a feasible direction
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for the optimization problem, given by
d = (λ∗, µ∗, χ¯ ∗) − (λ˜, µ˜, χ¯p )
⇒ dk =

E[ f˜ (q,η)], ∀k ∈ [m]
E[д˜(q,η)], ∀j ∈ m + [n]
χ¯∗
k
− χ¯p
k
, ∀k ∈ m + n + [mn].
Now we have,〈
d,∇h(2)j
〉
= h
(2)
j (λ∗, µ∗, χ ∗) − h
(2)
j (λ˜, µ˜, χ¯p ) = 0, ∀j ∈[m]
(48)〈
d,∇h(1)i
〉
= h
(1)
i (λ∗, µ∗, χ ∗) − h
(1)
i (E[λ˜, µ˜, χ¯p ) = 0, ∀i ∈[n]
(49)∑
k :( ⌈k/m⌉,k%(m+1))<E
ξ¯k (χ¯∗k − χ¯
p
k
)1 χ¯ ∗
k
=0 +
∑
k :( ⌈k/m⌉,k%(m+1))<E
ξk (χ¯∗k − χ¯
p
k
) ∗= 0,
(50)
where (∗) follows from the from the fact that χpi j = 0 and χ∗i j = 0 for
all (i, j) < E∗ and χ∗i j > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E∗ . Thus, by taking the inner
product on both the side by d in (47) and using (48), (49) and (50) we
get
〈
d,∇ f (λ∗, µ∗, χ¯ ∗)〉 = 0. Now, by equating 〈d,∇ f (λ∗, µ∗, χ¯ ∗)〉
to zero, we have the claim. 
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Under the two price policy, we will first
calculate the rate of arrival of requests. We have:
E[a(2)j ] = E
[
a
(2)
j |q
(2)
j ≤ q
η(2)
tpj
]
P[q(2)j ≤ q
η(2)
tpj
]
+ E
[
a
(2)
j |q
(2)
j > q
η(2)
tpj
]
P[q(2)j > q
η(2)
tpj
]
= λ∗j − θ
η
j P[q
(2)
j > q
η(2)
tpj
] ∀j ∈ [m],
Similarly, we also have:
E[a(1)i ] = µ∗i − ϕ
η
i P[q
(1)
i > q
η(1)
tpi
] ∀i ∈ [n].
Nowwe define a vector d ∈ Rn+m+mn which is a feasible direction
for the optimization problem, given by
d = (λ∗, µ∗, χ¯ ∗) − (E[a], χ¯T P )
⇒ dk =

θ
(2)
k
P[q(2)
k
> q
η(2)
tpk
], ∀k ∈ [m]
ϕ
(1)
k
P[q(1)
k
> q
η(1)
tpk
], ∀j ∈ m + [n]
χ¯∗
k
− χ¯T P
k
, ∀k ∈ m + n + [mn].
where χ¯T P ∈ Rmn
+
is the rate assignment vector for the two price
policy, analogous to χ¯p for a general pricing policy. By Lemma
5.3, the system is positive recurrent under the two price policy for
any θη > 0m and ϕ
η
> 0n and E[〈1m+n , q〉] < ∞. Next, as we
are using modified max weight policy, we only match using edges
in E∗. Finally, the two price policy falls under the form given in
(45) and (46). Thus, by Claim G.1, we have
〈
d,∇ f (λ∗, µ∗, χ¯ ∗)〉 = 0.
Thus, the lemma follows. 
H Proof of Theorem 5.2
Proof of Theorem 5.2. We will first calculate the revenue loss
given by (14) as follows:
Lη (51)
= R
η
∗ − (Rη − s 〈1n+m ,E[q]〉)
= η
〈
F (λ∗),λ∗〉−η 〈G(µ∗), µ∗〉 − η ( ∑
j∈[m]
Fj (λj )λjP[q(2)j ≤ q
(η(2))
tpj
]
+
∑
j∈[m]
Fj
(
λj −
θ
η
j
η
) (
λj −
θ
η
j
η
)
P[q(2)j > q
(η(2))
tpj
]
−
∑
i ∈[n]
Gi (µi )µiP[q(1)i ≤ q
(η(1))
tpi
] −
∑
i ∈[n]
Gi
(
µi −
ϕ
η
i
η
)
×(
µi −
ϕ
η
i
η
)
P[q(1)i > q
(η(1))
tpi
]
)
+ s 〈1m+n ,E[q]〉 .
= η
∑
j∈[m]
(
Fj (λj )λj − Fj
(
λj −
θ
η
j
η
) (
λj −
θ
η
j
η
) )
P[q(2)j > q
(η(2))
tpj
]
− η
∑
i ∈[n]
(
Gi (µi )µi −Gi
(
µi −
ϕ
η
i
η
) (
µi −
ϕ
η
i
η
) )
P[q(1)i > q
(η(1))
tpi
]
+ s 〈1m+n ,E[q]〉 .
∗
=
∑
j∈[m]
(
F
′
j (λj )λj + Fj (λj )
)
θ
η
j P[q
(2)
j > q
η(2)
tpj
] +s 〈1m+n ,E[q]〉 −∑
i ∈[n]
(
G
′
i (µi )µi +Gi (µi )
)
ϕ
η
i P[q
(1)
i >q
η(1)
tpi
]+O(η1/3).
where (∗) follows from the Taylor series expansion of the terms
F (λ∗ − θη/η) and G(µ∗ − ϕη/η) component wise and using θη =
Θ(η2/3) andϕη = Θ(η2/3). To expound, for type j customer, we can
obtain (∗) by the following steps:
ηFj (λj )λj − ηFj
(
λj −
θ
η
j
η
) (
λj −
θ
η
j
η
)
= ηFj (λj )λj
− η ©­«Fj (λj ) −
θ
η
j
η
F ′j (λj ) +
(
θ
η
j
η
)2
F ′′j (λj ) +O(η−2/3)
ª®¬
(
λj −
θ
η
j
η
)
=
(
Fj (λj ) + F ′j (λj )λj
)
θ
η
j −
(
F ′′j (λj )λj + F ′j (λj )
) (θη )2
η
+O(η1/3)
=
(
Fj (λj ) + F ′j (λj )λj
)
θ
η
j +O(η1/3).
By using Lemma 5.4, we can simplify the revenue loss for the ηth
system by eliminating the first order terms to get:
Lη ≤ O(η1/3) + s 〈1m+n ,E[q]〉 (52)
Now, using Lemma 5.3, we can upper bound the expected queue
length as follows:
E
[ 〈
θη , q(2)
〉
+
〈
ϕη , q(1)
〉 ]
≤
∑
j∈[m]
θ
η
j q
η(2)
tpj
P[q(2)j > q
η(2)
tpj
]
+
∑
i ∈[n]
ϕ
η
i q
(1)
tpi
P[q(1)i > q
η(1)
tpi
] + η 〈1m ,λ∗〉 + η 〈1n , µ∗〉
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⇒ min{(θη ,ϕη )}E[〈1m+n, q〉] ≤
∑
j∈[m]
θ
η
j q
η(2)
tpj
P[q(2)j > q
η(2)
tpj
]
+
∑
i ∈[n]
ϕ
η
i q
(1)
tpi
P[q(1)i > q
η(1)
tpi
] + η 〈1m ,λ∗〉 + η 〈1n , µ∗〉
⇒ min{(θη ,ϕη )}E[〈1m+n , q〉] ∗= O(η) ⇒ E[〈1m+n , q〉] ∗= O(η1/3)
(53)
where (∗) follows by substituting qηtp = T1η1/3, θη = T2η2/3 and
ϕη = T3η
2/3. Finally by substituting (53) in (52) we have the theo-
rem. 
I Proof of Proposition 6.1
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Rewriting the Bellman equation us-
ing the approximation of the value function gives us the following
optimization problem with finite variables and infinite constraints.
min
(д,bl ∀l ∈[r ])
д
subject to,
д ≥ R(q, z)+cEq,z
[
r∑
l=1
〈
bl ,V (ql , z)
〉]
−c
r∑
l=1
〈
bl , q
l
〉
∀q, z ∈ S×Z (q),
The decision variables in the above optimization problem are д
and bl ∀l ∈ [r ]. By approximation, we have projected our orig-
inal space of variables h ∈ Rbm+n
+
to a lower dimensional space
b ∈ R(m+n)×r
+
. Let the optimal solution to the above optimization
problem be (b∗
l
∀l ∈ [r ],д∗). Now define
h(q) =
r∑
l=1
〈
b∗
l
, ql
〉
∀q ∈ S .
The above defined h(q) along with д∗ will be a feasible solution to
the optimization problem (21) (22). Thus, the optimal value of (21)
(22) will be less than or equal to д∗. Thus, the proposition follows.

